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NOTES

interests, and this is equally true to all federal property, real or personal,
held or used by private individuals for their own gain. 60

Congress can, however, if and when it desires under its sovereign
powers immunize any federal agency or activity from state taxation and
thereby prevent even the taxation of private interests in federal property
used or held under government contract, and thus could have changed in
advance the outcome of the Alabama and Dravo cases.
GEORGE

J.

ARGERIS

PRIORITY BETWEEN MORTGAGES AND MECHANICS LIENS
In the Colorado decision of Darien v. Hudson,' the issue of priority
arose between a purchase money mortgage and a mechanic's lien. The
mortgagee had given the mortgagor additional funds to repair the house
on the property and had the mortgage recorded immediately. The mortgagor failed to apply these funds for the improvements, and as a result
mechanics liens were filed by the materialmen. The court held that the
mortgage did not take priority over the lien claimants, even though recorded first. Before discussing the cases that are relevant to this problem,
the Wyoming lien law and its interpretation should be considered.
Our Wyoming lien law was taken from Missouri. The three sections
which are pertinent to this problem say in substance that a mechanic's
lien shall attach to a building or improvement in preference to any prior
lien or incumbrance upon the land; that such building can be sold and
removed by the purchaser; 2 that a mechanic's lien shall be preferred to liens
that attach subsequent to the commencement of the building or improvement; 3 and that a mechanic's lien shall not affect any lien, incumbrance or
mortgage upon the land that was in existence at the inception of the
4
mechanic's lien.
These three sections were discussed in Prugh v. Imhoff. 5 The rule
seems to be that a separate and distinct building or erection is required
for the lien to have preference over an earlier mortgagee and where the
lien results only from repairs or improvements, the mechanic's lien is not
prior. As the court said in interpreting these sections, since a mortgage
covers the building as well as the land, the lien for repairs, or improvements which are put upon such existing building, will be subject to the
prior lien of the mortgage or deed of trust; otherwise, one's principal
60.
I.
2.

Carson v. Roan-Anderson Co. et aL., 312 U.S. 232, 72 S.Ct. 257, 96 L.Ed. 257 (1952).
Darien v. Judson, 134 Colo. 213, 302 P.2d 519 (1956).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 55-203 (1945).
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Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 55-207 (1945).

4.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 55-403 (1945).
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44 Wyo. 143, 9 P.2d 152 (1932).
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security might be repaired or improved out from under him. But if the
building, erection or improvement is an independent affair, not in existence when the mortgage was taken, it will be subject to the mechanic's
lien in preference to the mortgage and it may be sold and removed as provided by statute.
Three problems will be discussed in this note. The first arises where
the mortgagor makes improvements on the mortgaged premises without
any financial assistance from the mortgagee. The second involves the
mortgagee advancing the mortgagor money with which to repair or build,
such as a construction money mortgage. The third deals with severance
and pro rata distribution. There must be two assumptions before any
analysis can be made. One is that the mortgage was given and recorded
prior to any contract to build or actual work begun. The other is that
the mechanic's lienor has filed and given notice of his lien within the
statutory period.
Generally, where a purchase money mortgage is given and the mortgagee has no knowledge that improvements are being made, has not
advanced any money for building or repair, and there is no requirement
in the contract of purchase to build, the mortgagee will be prior.6 In one
case the priority was not lost even though the vendor and holder of the
purchase money mortgage required the vendee to build. 7 Also it has been
held that mere co-operation by the holder of a mortgage in the plans of
the grantor for improvements was not sufficient to give the mechanic's
lienor a priority. New York has held it immaterial that the mortgagee
reap the benefits of the work without having to pay for it, since the building contract was between the lienor and mortgagor who alone was liable to
the lienor.8 As the Georgia court said, before the mortgagee will lose his
priority, there must be some definite and affirmative act by the lender,
communicated to the materialmen, that could have led materialmen to
believe that the lender consented to his selling material to borrower on
credit. 9
Some courts recognizing the general rule as to mortgages, deny priority
upon some equitable principle or other theory. Such was the case of
Carew v. Stubbs,o in which d purchase money mortgage was given after
the construction contract. The court said that the vendee had "authority"
before the delivery of the deed to create liens on the land for labor and
materials. 1 The Missouri court, under similar facts, denied priority to
the mortgagee because they said that equity could hardly sanction a method
whereby the mortgagor entered into a contract to build and then after part
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
1I.

Reed & Sherwood Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 202 Minn. 274, 278 N.W. 30 (1938).
Chicago Lbr. Co. v. Schweitzer, 45 Kan. 255, 25 Pac. 592 (1891).
Ga. State Bank & Savings Ass'n. v. Wilson, 189 Ga. 21, 5 S.E.2d 14 (1939).
Ausable Chasm Co. v. Hotel Chasm & Country Club, 263 App. Div. 486, 33 N.Y.2d

427. (1937).
155 Mass. 549, 30 N.E. 219 (1892).
Jones v. Osborn, 108 Iowa 409, 70 N.W. 143 (1899).
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of the building was completed, executed a purchase money mortgage to the
true owner, the materialmen thinking all the time that he was dealing
with the true owner, when in fact he was not. 12 This may be authority
for the same proposition shouldn't occur in Wyoming.
To draw a rule from the foregoing cases seems a little difficult, but
it may be said that if the mortgagee has no knowledge that his mortgagor
is making repairs, he probably will not lose his priority absent statutory
provisions. But if a mortgagee negligently stands by and allows a materialman to contract on the basis of some misunderstanding, when in all fairness
the mortgagee should have told the lienors the true facts, the mortgagee
will probably be estopped from repudiating his own implied misrepresentations.
The next problem deals with either a purchase money mortgage with
additional sums to build or a construction money mortgage. Looking
solely to the Wyoming statutes, if the money is for repairs then no priority
will be given to the lienors. If it is for new construction then the lienors
have priority as to the building and may sever it from the land and
remove it within a reasonable time. 13 The issue could arise in Wyoming
as it did in Colorado where the money advanced was for repairs, and the
mortgagor did not apply the funds given under the mortgage to pay the
materialmen. Our court could say that the mortgagee has a duty to see
that these funds are applied for the purpose given, and to the extent that
they weren't, the mortgagee's priority may be lost.
The general rule of mortgage law, absent any statutory provision, is
that if the amount for which the mortgage shall stand is wholly optional
with the mortgagee, he cannot after he receives notice that a subsequent
lien has attached, have priority as to sums forwarded after notice of the
lien. If the sums are obligatory the mortgage is prior as to all amounts
advanced. 14 Some statutes, such as Oregon's, disregard the distinction
between optional future advances and obligatory, and just say that they
are subordinate to mechanics liens.15 Also, in Alabama, construction loans,
whether optional or obligatory, are by statute held to be inferior to
mechanics liens. 16. However, in Arkansas if the advances are obligatory,
the construction money mortgage has priority. 17
Many statutes or judicial decisions are based upon some duty. They
either place a duty on the mortgagee to see to it that his mortgagor
applies the funds properly or they place the burden on the lienors to in12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

Jefferson County Lbr. Co. v. Robinson, 121 S.W.2d 209 (1938).
Prugh v. Imhoff, 44 Wyo. 143, 9 P.2d 152 (1932); Schulenbery v. Hayden, 146 Mo.
583, 48 S.W. 472 (1898); Wilson v. Lubke, 176 Mo. 210, 75 S.W. 602 (1903).
Superior Lumber Co. v. Nat'l. Bank of Commerce, 176 Ark. 300, 2 S.W.2d 1093
(1928).
Drake v. Pagett Mortgage Co., 203 Ore. 66, 274 P.2d 804 (1954).

Baker Sand & Gravel Co. v. Rogers Plumbing & Heating Co., 228 Ala. 612, 154 So.
591 (1934).
Ark. Stat. § 51-605 (1947)'.
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quire into the records to see if there are any existing liens on the building
or land for which they are furnishing materials or labor. As the Arkansas
court so aptly put it, laborers and materialmen can learn the purpose for
which the money was raised by examining the records, and if they do not
believe the borrower will use it for the purpose they can refuse to furnish
materials without some further security for payment. The court said that
the sole test of superiority of liens upon the lands before improvements
are made is the purpose for which the money is raised or borrowed, and
not the use made of it.18

Some courts approach this problem, not by talking in terms of optional
or obligatory advances, nor in terms of duty, but rather to the problem as a
whole and limit the mortgagee's prior lien, to the extent of the funds
actually used in the project. As the Mississippi court'0 said, where the
mortgagee did nothing to see that the construction was being paid for and
merely turned over money to the contractor as he asked for it, the mortgagee's lien was superior to liens of materialmen only to the extent that its
funds actually went into the project. The court went on to say that the
mortagee should advance the proceeds with reasonable diligence in order
that the holders of statutory liens may not be unjustly defeated in their
claims. Where the whole amount for which the mortgage was given was
advanced and applied in construction of the building, the construction
money mortgage has priority. 20 The Colorado court 2' has said that when
the lienors have notice of the existence of a mortgage which is given
expressly for the purpose of securing funds to construct an improvement,
and know that the funds thus obtained are being applied in that way, the
lienors will have a subordinate claim. The court still limited the mortgagee's priority to the proceeds of the loan that were actually applied in
the improvement of the property.
It might be interesting to note that the Colorado court did not mention
this Journalman case 22 in their opinion in the Darien23 case. The two
cases may be distinguished on their facts. In the Journalmancase the lienors
had knowledge that a prior mortgage existed and the mortgagor applied
at least some of the money advanced by the mortgagee to the improvements of the property. In the Darien case it doesn't appear that either of
these facts were present. The rule in Colorado appears to be that a
mortgagee must give the lienors actual notice of his mortgage, that he has
a duty to see that these funds are applied to the improvement and that
the mortgagee's lien will be prior as to those funds actually used in the
repair or construction of the mortgaged premises.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Ashdown Hardware Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ark. 541, 267 S.W.2d 294 (1954).
1st Nat'l. Bank of Greenville v. Virden, 208 Miss. 679, 45 So.2d 268 (1950); Weiss
v. Nachetz Co,, 166 Miss. 253, 140 So. 736 (1932).
Brush v. Bohan, 102 Cal. 457, 283 Pac. 126 (1929); Community Lbr. Co. of Baldwin
v. Calif. Publ. Co., 215 Cal. 274, 10 P.2d 60 (1932).
Journalman v. McPhee, 31 Colo. 26, 71 Pac. 419 (1903).
Ibid.
Supra note i.
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The last problem is that of severance which arises under the Wyoming
statutes providing that the mortgagee has priority as to the land, but that
the mechanics lienors have priority as to the building, with the right to
remove within a reasonable time. 24 If the building is a brick or concrete
structure then it cannot be removed without substantial injury to the
land or to the building. Sale of the entire property and pro rata distribution of the proceeds would seem to be a possible solution, but this has
been expressly disapproved in Missouri, at least where the mortgage
indebtedness is not yet due and payable. 2 5 The court there indicated
that there is no procedure at all in Missouri even though the mortgage was
due and payable. When courts find that the property is not feasibly
separable, and won't apply the pro rata doctrine, they say in effect that the
26
lien priority is gone.
.In Alabama, the court held that in case of repairs, the lienor could
come into equity and have sale of the property ordered, even though the
prior mortgage on the property was not yet due, the mortgagee sharing in
the proceeds upon a pro rata basis. 2 7 Also, in a later decision of the same
jurisdiction, 28 the court said where there was a mortgage on the land,
equity courts in a suit to enforce mechanics liens, could, where removal of
the building would in a large measure operate to destroy the security,
adjust priorities in the proceeds on equitable principles. This may be
authority in Wyoming that a pro rata distribution can be made, contrary to
the Missouri decisions.
Some states by statute have incorporated the pro rata distribution
into their law.2 9 This seems to be the more sensible solution regardless
of whether the building is separable or not. North Dakota has a different
rule. It changed from the severance rule and the statute of that state in
effect provides that where the mortgagee has a prior recorded mortgage on
the land, he is prior to the land and the building. When the lienors have
a prior lien on the building, they have a priority as to the building and
the land.3 0
In conclusion, it seems that a revision of our mechanics lien law
would be in order. As to the first problem discussed, where the mortgagee
has not advanced funds for construction, but has knowledge that his mortgagor is making repairs or additions, a statute similar to Minnesota,3 1
requiring the mortgagee to give actual notice to the lienors to maintain his
priority, would equitably take care of the problem.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Supra note 13.
Gold Lbr. Co. v. Baker, 225 Mo.App. 849, 36 S.W.2d 130 (1931).
Hammann v. McMullen, 122 Tex. 476, 62 S.W.2d 59 (1933); Grand Opera House
Co. v. McGuire, 14 Mont. 558, 37 Pac. 607 (1894).
Wimberly v. Mayberry, 94 Ala. 240, 10 So. 157 (1891).
Supra note 16.
Green v. Sexton, 196 Iowa 1086, 196 N.W. 27 (1923).
Woolridge v. Torgrinson, 59 N.D. 307, 229 N.W. 805 (1930).
Minn. Stat. § 514.05 (1953).
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As to the second situation discussed, where the mortgagee has given
funds for construction, a state similar to Ohio's 32 would seem better than

our present statute. This type of statute would give priority to the building loan mortgage but would make that priority depend on the rightful
application of the building loan installments. Also a posting of notice
on the lot or land could be required so that the lienors have actual notice
of the existing mortgage.
As to the last proposition, the severance type statute3 3 seems to be
outdated and impractical. It seems that if the entire property was sold
and each claimant given his pro rata share of the proceeds the additional
expense of removing the building would be eliminated, the building
would not be partially destroyed by the moving, a purchaser would pay
more for the building as it was on the land, and thus neither party would
be hurt to any appreciable extent.
AL KAUFMAN*

CREATION OF ROYALTIES PRIOR TO LEASING
A recent Colorado case has again raised questions as to the use of the
expression "oil and gas royalty."' Some of the questions are: (I) what is
it, (2) how do you create it, and (3) can it be created prior to the execution of an oil and gas lease. This note will be limited primarily to a consideration of the third question, although something must be said about
the others before there can be any clear discussion of the selected question.
Ordinarily, the term "oil and gas royalty" refers to an expense-free
share of the oil and gas. 2 It is expense free in the sense that it does not
32. Code of Ohio § 1311.14.
33. I11.
Rev. Stat. c. 82, § 16 (1949).
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is now practicing with the United States District Attorney's office in Cheyenne. Wyoming.
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